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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Deborah L. Rhode*
"Equal justice under law" is one of America's most firmly
embedded and widely violated legal principles.
It embellishes
courthouse entries, ceremonial occasions, and occasionally even
constitutional decisions. But it comes nowhere close to describing the
justice system in practice. Millions of Americans lack any access to
the system, let alone equal access. An estimated four-fifths of the civil
legal needs of the poor, and the needs of an estimated two- to threefifths of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.1 Governmental
legal services and indigent criminal defense budgets are capped at
ludicrous levels, which make effective assistance of counsel for most
low-income litigants a statistical impossibility. 2 We tolerate a system
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1. For unmet needs of the poor, see Access to Justice Development Campaign
2000: The Case for Support, Mich. B.J., Mar. 2000, at 370; Alan W. Houseman, Civil
LegalAssistance for the Twenty-First Century:Achieving Equal Justicefor All, 17 Yale
L. & Pol'y Rev. 369, 402 (1998) [hereinafter Houseman, Legal Assistance]; David C.
Leven, Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 Touro L Rev. 1, 6-7 (1999); Robert
J. Rhudy, Comparing Legal Services to the Poor in the United States with Other
Western Countries: Some Preliminary Lessons, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 223,
224 (1994); Fla. Bar Ass'n, Access to the Legal System 29 (1999); Legal Servs. Corp.,
Serving the Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans: A Special Report to
Congress 12 (2000); Legal Services Project, Funding Civil Legal Services for the Poor
Report to the Chief Judge 5 (1998); Or. State Bar Ass'n, The State of Access to
Justice in Oregon (2000); and Hearing on the Legal Services CorporationBefore the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Judiciary Comm. (1999)
(statement of John Pickering). For unmet needs of middle income consumers, see
ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Agenda for Access: The
American People and Civil Justice (1996); ABA Consortium on Legal Services and
the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans (1994); Maryland
Moderate-Income Access to Justice Advisory Taskforce, Preliminary Report and
Preliminary Recommendations on the Unmet Legal Needs of Moderate-Income
Persons in Maryland (1996) [hereinafter Maryland Report]; and Roy W. Reese &
Carolyn A. Aldred, ABA, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-Income
Households: Summary of Findings for the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study (1995).
See also Access to Justice Working Group, Report to the State Bar of California 4-6
(1996) [hereinafter California Report] (estimating that three-quarters of the needs of
California poor are unmet).
2. See infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text.
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in which money often matters more than merits and equal protection
principles are routinely subverted in practice.
This is not, of course, the only legal context in which rhetoric
outruns reality. But it is one of the most disturbing, given the
fundamental nature of the individual rights at issue. It is a shameful
irony that the nation with the world's most lawyers has one of the
least adequate systems for legal assistance. It is more shameful still
that the inequities attract so little concern. Over the last two decades,
national spending on legal aid has been cut by a third, and increasing
restrictions have been placed on the cases and clients that
government-funded programs can accept. Entire categories of the
"unworthy poor" have been denied assistance, and courts have largely
acquiesced in these limitations.3 The case law governing effective
assistance of counsel and access to nonlawyer services is a conceptual
embarrassment. Yet neither the public nor the profession has been
moved to respond in any significant fashion. Access to justice is the
subject for countless bar commissions, committees, conferences, and
colloquia, but it is not a core concern in American policy decisions,
constitutional jurisprudence, or law school curricula.
This article argues for a more attainable aspiration. It begins with a
candid confrontation of our failures: our unwillingness to take equal
justice seriously at a conceptual, doctrinal, political, or professional
level. And it concludes with a challenge to do better. The aim is not a
detailed deconstruction of constitutional case law or an exhaustive
examination of policy proposals. The objective rather is to explore
the outlines of a more manageable commitment- adequate access to
justice-and some strategies for pushing us in that direction.
I. CONCEPTUAL FAILURES

In theory, "equal justice under law" is difficult to oppose. In
practice, however, it begins to unravel at several key points, beginning
with what we mean by "justice." Is our commitment to substantive or
procedural fairness?
In conventional usage, the concept seems largely procedural.
"Equal justice" is usually taken to mean "equal access to justice,"
which in turn is taken to mean access to law.4 But as is frequently
noted, a purely procedural understanding by no means captures our
aspirations. Those who receive their "day in court" do not always feel
that "justice has been done," and with reason. The role of money and
special interests in the legislative process often skews the law to insure
3. See infra Part IV.

4. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Legal Aid Is Abolished, 2 J. Inst. for Study
Legal Ethics 375, 386 (1999); Stephen L. Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J. Inst. for Study
Legal Ethics 269, 272 (1999); Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor'sRight to Equal Access to

the Courts, 13 Conn. L. Rev. 651, 655 (1981).
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that the "haves come out ahead."5 Procedural hurdles and burdens of
proof may prevent the have-nots from translating formal rights into
legal judgments. And post-judgment power relations between the
parties may make legal victories too expensive and difficult to enforce,
or may prompt legislative backlash. Those who win in court may still
lose in life.
These difficulties are seldom acknowledged in bar discussions
regarding access to justice. Their prevailing theme is that more is
better, and their focus is on how to achieve it. But these discussions
leave a host of conceptual complexities unaddressed. Even from a
purely procedural standpoint, what does meaningful access to law
imply? If, as is commonly assumed, it also entails access to legal
assistance, how much is enough? For what, for whom, and from
whom? What kinds of matters and which potential clients should
receive assistance? When do legal services need to come from lawyers
rather than from other qualified providers? Should government
funding extend only to those who are officially deemed poor or to all
of those who cannot realistically afford lawyers? How much claiming
and blaming is our society prepared to subsidize? How do legal needs
compare with other claims on our collective resources? And, most
importantly, who should decide?
The complexities are compounded if we also think seriously about
what would make justice truly "equal." Equal to what or to whom? If
our standard is the proverbial "reasonable person," how much would
that individual be prepared to pay for process? If our standard is
opposing parties, how, realistically, do we deal with disparities in
incentives, resources, and legal ability? Although there is broad
agreement that the quality of justice should not depend on the ability
to pay, there is little corresponding consensus on an alternative. And
as R.H. Tawney once noted about equal opportunity generally, one
wonders what would alarm proponents most, "the denial of the
principle or the attempt to apply it."6 Given the elasticity of legal
needs among the general public and the disparity of talent within the
profession, any serious effort to equalize access would require not
only massive public expenditures but the prohibition of private
purchases.
II. POLICY FAILURES

Part of the reason that we are reluctant to confront these problems
involves the scale of subsidies that would be necessary for solutions.
Unlike most other industrialized nations, the United States recognizes

5. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead?: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974) (internal quotation omitted).
6. R.H. Tawney, Equality 103 (1964).

1788

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

no right to legal assistance for civil matters.7 Although courts have
discretion to appoint counsel where necessary to assure due process,
they have done so only in a narrow category of cases, and legislatures
have guaranteed compensation for a still more limited number of
matters.8 The nation has only about one legal aid lawyer or public
defender for every 4300 persons below the poverty line compared
with a ratio of one lawyer for every 380 Americans in the population
generally.' The federal government, which provides about two-thirds
of the funding for civil legal aid, now spends only about $300 million
for such assistance. This works out to roughly $8 per year for those
officially classified poor and less than 1% of the nation's total
expenditures on lawyers. 10
Recent estimates suggest that well over ten times that amount, on
the order of three to four billion dollars, would be required to meet
the civil legal needs of low-income Americans." Such estimates
substantially understate the magnitude of expenditures necessary to
guarantee adequate access, since they do not include either the unmet
needs of middle-income Americans who are now priced out of the
legal process, or collective concerns such as environmental risks,
community economic development, and racial discrimination in public
education or political reapportionment plans.
Nor do these access-to-justice projections take into account the cost
of providing truly adequate assistance in criminal cases and in the
limited number of civil proceedings where indigents are already
entitled to court-appointed counsel. Hourly rates and statutory caps
on compensation for private lawyers are set at utterly unrealistic
levels. Rates for out-of-court work are as low as $20 or $2512per hour,
which does not even cover overhead in cities like New York.
7. California Report, supra note 1, at 3-4; Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal
Justice: Where the United States Stands Two Decades Later, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 199 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson, EqualJustice].
8. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981); Yarbrough v.
Superior Court, 702 P.2d 583 (Cal. 1985). For further discussion of Yarbrough, see
infra note 76.
9. This figure is based on the number of lawyers in private practice or working
for private organizations. See Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The

U.S. Legal Profession in 1995 tbl. 4 (1990).
10. See Rhudy, supra note 1, at 236-38. According to the most recent figures
available, in 1998 there were approximately 35,574,000 persons below the poverty
level. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States tbl. 763
(119th ed. 1999). The 1998 budget for the Legal Services Corporation was $283
million. Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2000, at 595 (1999). Estimated expenditures
by the Legal Services Corporation for fiscal year 2000 are $303 million. Id. tbl. 11.3.
11. California Report, supra note 1, at 40 (putting the figure at $3.6 billion);
Hazard, supra note 4, at 380 (estimating between $4-5 billion).
12. Mark Green & Child Planning and Advocacy Now, Justice Denied: The Crisis
in Legal Representation of Birth Parents in Child Protective Proceedings iv (2000);
Jayson Blair, The Lawyers Live to Fight Again, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2000, § 4, at 3;
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Many litigants theoretically entitled to counsel go without, or suffer
long delays and inadequate assistance because court-appointments are
a financial loss for lawyers. 13 Limits of $1000 are common for felony
cases, and some states allow less than half that amount. 4 In
jurisdictions like Virginia, which allocates $300, teenagers selling
sodas on the beach do better than court-appointed counsel.,' Low
ceilings apply even for defendants facing the death penalty, and

attorneys subject to such compensation caps have ended up with
hourly rates below $4.16 For most court-appointed lawyers, thorough
preparation is a quick route to financial ruin. Analogous constraints
arise in public defender offices that generally operate with crushing
caseloads. Defense lawyers often juggle up to 500 felony matters at a
given time, which precludes significant preparation for the vast
majority of clients. 7
The problems are still worse in many jurisdictions that rely on
competitive bids.
There, defense counsel agree to provide
representation for a specified percentage of criminal dockets
irrespective of the number or complexity of cases. Such systems favor
attorneys willing to turn over high volumes of clients at low costs, and
caseloads of 900 felonies or 3500 misdemeanors per year are not
uncommon. 8 Some of these attorneys have not taken a case to trial in
years, and seldom file any pretrial motions. 9 Even defendants facing
the death penalty have ended up with lawyers who have "never tried a
case before and never should again."20
Defendants who hire their own counsel do not always fare better.
Most of these individuals are just over the line of indigency, and

Somini Sengupta, Report Says Lack of Lawyers Crippling Family Court, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 2000, § 1, at 35; Joel Stashenko, Manhattan Lawyers Latest to Challenge
Attorneys Fees, Associated Press, Feb. 25,2000.
13. Laura Mansnerus, A Break on the Wheels of Justice: Shortage of Lawyvers for
the Poor Plaguesthe Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,2001, at BI.
14. For private practitioners, see David I. Cole, No Equal Justice 83-85 (1999);
Richard Klein & Robert Spangenberg, ABA, The Indigent Defense Crisis 5-6 (1993);
Marcia Coyle, Hoping for $75/Hour, Nat'l L.J., June 7, 1999, at Al; and Bob Herbert,
Cheap Justice in America, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,1998, § 4, at 15.
15. Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Actual Innocence 204 (2000).
16. Cole, supra note 14, at 84; Herbert supra note 14.
17. Cole, supra note 14, at 83; Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor tie Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer. 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 185051 (1995) [hereinafter Bright, Counsel for the Poor]; J. Michael McWilliams, The
Erosion of Indigent Rights: Excessive Caseloads Resulting in Ineffective Counsel for
Poor,79 A.B.A. J. 8 (1993).
18. Alan Berlow, Requiem for a Public Defender, Am. Prospect, June 5, 2000, at
28.
19. Marvin Zalman & Larry J. Siegel, Criminal Procedure: Constitution and
Society 453 (2d ed. 1997); see also Berlow, supra note 18, at 28, 30-32; cf Chester
Mursky, Quality Legal Aid- Going, Going, Gone, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 4,1995, at A19.
20. Stephen B. Bright, Keep the Hope of Equal Justice Alive, Address at Yale
Law School Commencement (May 24, 1999), in Yale L Rep., Fall 1999, at 22.
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cannot afford substantial legal expenses .2 Their lawyers typically
charge a flat fee, payable in advance, which creates obvious incentives
to plea bargain. Only defendants who have celebrated cases or can
meet steep charges, usually in white-collar or organized-crime cases,
have ready access to the highly skilled advocacy that the public sees in
publicized trials. Where defendants lack such resources, counsel face
further temptations to curtail their advocacy. A quick plea spares
lawyers the strain and potential humiliation of an unsuccessful trial.
Such bargains also preserve good working relationships with judges
and prosecutors, who face their own often overwhelming caseload
demands. In this system, effective representation is the exception, not
the rule, and it is often better to be rich and guilty than poor and
innocent.22
Our pretensions to equal justice mesh poorly with these financial
realities. But rather than addressing the tension, we retreat into
comforting generalities and ceremonial platitudes. We embrace
access and equality, but without making any serious effort to give
them practical content. In a world of limited resources, we urgently
need limiting principles. Our failure to develop any conceptually
coherent strategies for reconciling our ideals and institutions has
contributed to corresponding failures at both the political and
doctrinal level.
III. POLITICAL FAILURES

Much of the problem in securing broader access to justice stems
from the public's failure to recognize that there is, in fact, a problem.
A wide gap persists between popular perceptions and daily realities,
particularly for criminal cases. Most Americans are convinced that
the legal system coddles criminals and that defense lawyers get far too
many defendants off on technicalities.'
The trials featured in
entertainment media reinforce this perception. In the courtrooms
that the public sees, zealous advocacy is the norm. O.J. Simpson's
lawyers left no stone unturned. But they were charging by the stone.
Most defense counsel cannot-and it matters. In recent studies,
between half and four-fifths of counsel entered guilty pleas without
interviewing any prosecution witnesses, and four-fifths did so without
filing any defense motions.24
21. Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Poor, Should Get Appointed
Counsel in CriminalCases: The Route to True EqualJustice, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 47, 5152, 56 (1997).
22. Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the
Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a
Proposalfor Reform, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 743, 802-13 (1995); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Plea Bargainingas Disaster,101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1988 (1992).
23. ABA, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System (1999).
24. Margaret L. Steiner, Adequacy of Fact Investigation in Criminal Defense
Lawyers' Trial Preparation,1981 Ariz. St. L.J. 523, 538; Mike McConville & Chester
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The rationalizations for such inadequate efforts occasionally surface
with chilling candor. In one Texas case, a defendant managed to win
release after seven years of imprisonment. His court-appointed
attorney had seen no reason to go to "sleazy bars to look for
witnesses," since he assumed, without investigation, that his client was
guilty.' In a recent North Carolina case, a court-appointed lawyer
acknowledged that he had deliberately failed to file a timely appeal
because he felt that his client "deserved to die."'
Similar rationalizations are apparent among legislators who refuse
to support adequate funding for court-appointed counsel. Their
position is understandable, given an electorate more interested in
getting tough on criminals than in subsidizing their defense. The chair
of a Missouri appropriations committee expressed common attitudes
with uncommon candor in announcing publicly that "he [did not] care
if indigents [were] represented or not."2
Although recent
exonerations of wrongfully convicted defendants through DNA
evidence have increased public concerns about the adequacy of their
defense, budget priorities have rarely changed in response.'s
With respect to civil legal assistance, the public is more supportive,
but equally misinformed. As an abstract matter, the vast majority of
Americans favors providing legal assistance for the poor in civil cases.
Depending on how the question is asked, between 65 and 85% of
those surveyed support such aid.29 However, most would prefer the
assistance to come from volunteer lawyers rather than from
government-funded attorneys, half believe that legal aid lawyers
contribute to frivolous litigation, and 40% favor providing only
advice, not advocacy in court. 3 Public attitudes also vary considerably
Mirsky, Guilty Plea Courts: A Social DisciplinaryModel of Criminal Justice, 42 Soc.

Probs. 216 (1995).
25. William A. Mintz, Lawyer Wouldn't Go to 'Sleazy Bar,' Client Wins Freedom
from Life Term, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 24, 1980, at 7.
26. Sara Rimer, Lawyer Sabotaged Case of a Client on Death Row, N.Y. Times,

Nov. 24,2000, at A37.
27. Ron Ostroff, Missouri Remains Unable to Pay Indigents' Counsel; Pro Bono
Revolt Grows, Nat'l LJ., May 11, 1981, at 2.
28. The Innocence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4167, 106th Cong. §§ 201-03

(2000), would provide significant incentives for states to meet minimal standards for
representation of indigent defendants in capital cases and would provide federal

funding for efforts by public agencies and private, nonprofit organizations to improve
such representation.
29. Legal
Servs.

Corp.,

Low

Income

Legal

Assistance

Poll,

http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/pr-poll.htm (citing 1999 Harris survey results indicating that
66% of adults believed that legal aid should be available for the poor in cases

involving child custody, adoption and divorce; 80% believed aid should be available
in cases of domestic violence; and 81% in cases involving fraud against the elderly);
Belden Russonello & Stewart, National Survey on Civil Legal Aid (2000)
(unpublished report on file with author) (finding that 82% of those surveyed favor
government funded legal aid).
30. Belden Russonello & Stewart, supra note 29.
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depending on the kinds of cases and clients at issue. Assistance in
cases involving domestic violence, divorce, child custody, and fraud
against elderly victims attracts broad support. 1 For other claims, such
as those involving challenges to welfare legislation or prison
conditions, one Denver legal aid attorney aptly noted that "[t]he only
thing less popular than a poor person these days is a poor person with
a lawyer."32
Not only are Americans ambivalent about ensuring legal assistance,
they are ill-informed about the assistance currently available. Almost
four-fifths incorrectly believe that the poor are currently entitled to
legal aid in civil cases. 3 Only a third think that the poor would have a
very difficult time obtaining assistance; a quarter think it would be
easy.' Such perceptions are wildly out of touch with reality. Legal
services offices can handle less than a fifth of the needs of eligible
clients and often are able to offer only brief advice, not the full range
of assistance that is necessary. 5 In some jurisdictions, poor people
must wait over two years before seeing a lawyer for matters like
divorce that are not considered emergencies, and other offices exclude
such matters entirely. 6 Legal aid programs that accept federal funds
also may not accept entire categories of cases or clients who seldom
have anywhere else to go, such as prisoners, undocumented
immigrants, or individuals with claims involving abortions,
homosexual rights, or challenges to welfare legislation.37
Most Americans agree that wealthy litigants have advantages in the
legal system, and only a third think that courts try to treat rich and
poor alike. Yet few seem aware of the extent of the advantages or
feel inclined to do anything about them.38 Eighty percent think that
"[i]n spite of its problems, the American justice system is still the best

31. See supra note 29.
32. Robert Pear, As Welfare OverhaulLooms, Legal Aid for Poor Dwindles, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 1995, at Al (quoting Jonathan D. Asher). For legislative restrictions
on federally funded legal aid, see supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
33. Johnson, EqualJustice, supra note 7, at 201.
34. Belden Russonello & Stewart, supra note 29.
35. Pickering, supra note 1, at 52-53 (noting that approximately 10% of federally
funded legal aid cases are litigated and the average expenditure is only about $300 per
case).
36. The Bronx Legal Aid Society office has a "two-and-one-half-year waiting list
to receive an appointment for a divorce." Legal Services Project, supra note 1, at 4.
see also Mitchell Zuckoff, Uneven Justice: Limited Funds for Legal Aid Can Lead to
Mismatches in Civil Cases, Boston Globe, Mar. 12,2000, at Al.
37. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610-42 (1999).
38. ABA, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, supra note 23, at 59 (finding that
90% of "wealthy people or companies often wear down their opponents by dragging
out legal proceedings"); see also Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, How the Public Views the
State Courts: A 1999 National Survey 22 (1999) [hereinafter Nat'l Ctr. for State
Courts, Public Views] (finding that two-thirds of those surveyed believe that courts
are not affordable for ordinary citizens).
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in the world. '39 It is by no means clear that such support would persist
if the public were more aware of what passes for justice among the
have-nots. Most people are poorly informed about the legal system
and much of their information comes from idealized portrayals in
civics classes and popular media.' Few have any direct experience
with how the system functions-or fails to function-for the poor.4
What if ordinary citizens watched the "meet 'em, greet 'em and plead
'em" criminal defense bar "dispose" of felony cases in under two

hours with no investigation?42 What if the public saw civil courts take
weeks to try a commercial dispute between wealthy businesses but
give less than five minutes to decide the future of an abused or
neglected child? 43 What if most Americans had the experience of
appearing in housing courts, where less than 10% of tenants could
afford lawyers, and those who could had a far greater chance of
prevailing on similarly legitimate claims?'
Such experiences have not been part of the public debate over
access to justice. The way the debate has been framed has worked
against broad popular support for poverty law programs. The Legal
Services Corporation ("LSC"), which oversees federal civil legal aid
grants, has long been a favorite target of the political right. The most
39. ABA, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, supra note 23, at 59.
40. Id. (finding that only one-quarter of those surveyed were well-informed and
that the chief sources of information were elementary and high school classes); Nat'l
Ctr. for State Courts, Public Views, supra note 38 (finding that 60% get information
from electronic media and 50% from print).
41. Only one-half of those surveyed had had any direct experience with courts.
One-quarter of those surveyed had been on juries, and about one-quarter had been
parties. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Public Views, supra note 38. By definition, jury
service involved cases that went to trial, which are rare for the poor. Studies are
divided about how direct experience affects perceptions of the courts. Compare id.
(finding that those with greater knowledge had less confidence), with ABA,
Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, supra note 23 (finding that those with recent
experience felt more positive).
42. Berlow, supra note 18, at 28. For time estimates, see id. and Lois G. Forer,
Money and Justice: Who Owns the Courts? 120 (1984).
43. Forer, supra note 42, at 23, 99,132-33.
44. Legal Services Project, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that 90% of New York
tenants lack counsel in eviction proceedings); Russel Engler, Out of Sight and Out of
Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations With Unrepresented Poor
Persons, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 79, 107-08, 154-55 (1997) [hereinafter Engler, Out of Sight]
(citing studies where 90% of tenants are unrepresented and often relinquish
legitimate defenses due to exploitation of their ignorance); see Karl Monsma &
Richard Lempert, The Value of Counsel 20 Years of Representation Before a Public
Housing Eviction Board, 26 Law & Soc'y Rev. 627, 645-53 (1992) (reporting that in a
study of Hawaiian public housing eviction proceedings, represented tenants had a 1%
probability of eviction for financial nonperformance and a 29% probability of eviction
for behavioral violations, while during one period out of six examined unrepresented
tenants had a 51% and 67% probability of eviction, for the same respective
violations); Steven Gunn, Note, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly
Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 Yale L. & Po'y Rev. 385, 413 (1995) (noting that
"legal services tenants were more than three times as likely to avoid eviction as were
unrepresented tenants" in New Haven eviction actions).

1794

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

effective state and local programs have attracted similar opposition. 5
Congressional critics like Representative Dan Burton paint the LSC
as a "reckless and irresponsible agency" with a "left-wing political
agenda that hurts the poor more than it helps. '46 Republican Steve
Largent, in an op-ed piece explaining why the LSC should be
abolished, asks: "Ever wonder why some prisoners have cushy
amenities such as cable TV, why evicting drug dealers from housing
projects is so difficult, or why reforming the welfare system is taking
so long? Well wonder no more. We have the Legal Services
Corporation to blame." 47
Such claims build on longstanding objections both to governmentsubsidized legal services and to required pro bono assistance by

private lawyers. In critics' view, much of this aid in fact worsens the
plight of its intended beneficiaries. The most commonly cited
example involves representation of tenants with "marginal" cases;
landlords forced to litigate such matters allegedly pass on their costs in
the form of increased rents to the non-litigious poor.
Other
illustrations of assertedly counterproductive legal assistance involve
welfare claims that promote dependency; efforts to prevent evictions
of drug dealers or expulsions of disruptive students; and farmworkers'
49
lawsuits that encourage mechanization and increase unemployment.
A related objection is that even if some legal services do help the
poor, it is inefficient to provide those services in kind rather than
through cash transfers. Earmarking government or pro bono funds
for legal aid assertedly encourages overinvestments in law, as opposed
to other purchases that the poor might value more, such as food,
medicine, education, or housing." Critics note that poor people with
45. See Bruce Rushton, Legislature '95: Legal Aid Agencies Face Legislative Ax;
Lawmakers Object to Help for Migrant Farm Workers, News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.),
Apr. 15, 1995, at B1; Anne Windishar, Poor Need Legal Help Now More Than Ever,
Spokesman Rev. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 6, 1995, at A12. Law school clinics also
have been targets. See Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal
Education:Denying Access to Justice,74 Tul. L. Rev. 235 (1999).
46. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, An Unsolved Mystery: Why are Rogue Politicians
Trying to Kill a Program that Helps Their Neediest Constituents? 2 (1999) (quoting
Rep. Burton).
47. Steve Largent, It's a Good Idea Gone Bad, USA Today, May 25, 1995, at A12.
48. Jonathan R. Macey, MandatoryPro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for
the Rich?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1115, 1117 (1992) (quoting John A. Humbach, Serving
the Public Interest. An Overstated Objective, 65 A.B.A. J. 564, 564-65 (1979)); see also
Werner Z. Hirsh, Law And Economics: An Introductory Analysis 63-81 (2d ed. 1988).
49. Impact of EPA and OSHA Regulations on Small Business: HearingBefore the
House Comm. on Small Bus., Gov't Programs,and Oversight (1998) (testimony of
Kenneth F. Boehm) [hereinafter Boehm, Testimony]; see also Legal Services for the
Poor: Time for Reform (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990) [hereinafter Besharov];
Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services Program:Unaccountable,Political,Anti-Poor,
Beyond Reform and Unnecessary,17 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 321 (1998) [hereinafter
Boehm, Legal Services].
50. Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 513-14 (5th ed. 1998); Charles
Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not to Like About Being a Lawyer?, 109 Yale L.J.
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unmet legal needs rarely spend their discretionary income on
lawyers. 1 And it is by no means clear that clients, if given the choice,
would invest in the kinds of impact litigation that legal services
attorneys often prefer.52 Although supporters of legal aid programs
"cite the concept of equal access to justice," critics emphasize that the
"reality is that there is nothing resembling equality in [those
programs'] case selection process[es]."
There are a number of difficulties with these claims that do not
emerge clearly in public debate. To begin with, the value of legal
assistance cannot be gauged by what the poor are currently willing to
pay. The poor also invest very little in expensive private education for
their children, but that hardly suggests that they do not value first-rate
schools s Those who cannot meet their most basic subsistence needs
often are unable to make purchases that would prove cost-effective in
the longer term. That is part of what traps them in poverty. Legal
services are often a more efficient use of resources than subsistence
goods. A few hours of legal work may result in benefits far exceeding
their costs. In its "Access to Justice" series defending the LSC, the
Brennan Center offers a host of examples: domestic violence victims
in need of protective orders; brain-damaged children and senior
citizens on fixed incomes erroneously denied medical coverage; and
impoverished nursing mothers exposed to dangerous pesticides.5 For
many forms of legal assistance, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to attach a precise dollar value, but the benefits may be enormous and
enduring. 6 For millions of poor people, government subsidized or
pro bono services make it possible to divorce and remarry, to adopt a
child, and to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.
Moreover, law is a public good. Protecting legal rights often has
value beyond what those rights are worth to any single client. Holding
employers accountable for unsafe farm working conditions, or making
landlords liable for violations of housing codes and eviction
procedures can provide a crucial deterrent against future abuse.
Contrary to critics' claims, it is by no means clear that the costs of
defending such lawsuits will all be passed on to other poor people, or
that those costs are excessive in light of the deterrent value that they
1443, 1481-84 (2000).
51. Silver & Cross, supra note 50, at 1484.
52. See Besharov, supra note 49, at 3-29 ch. 1; Boehm, Legal Services, supra note
49, at 329-36.
53. Boehm, Testimony, supra note 49.
54. See David Luban & Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono as a Professional
Responsibility (unpublished manuscript on file with authors, 2000).
55. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Legal Services Clients Tell Their Story 2 (1999); see

Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Restricting Legal Services: How Congress Left the Poor with
Only Half a Lawyer 2, 9-10,13 (1999).
56. Hearing Before the Subconun. on Depts. of Commerce, Justice, and State and
the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House AppropriationsComrns., 106th Cong.
(1999) (testimony of Douglas S. Eakeley, Chairman, LSC).
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serve. Whether the landlord will in fact raise the rent is a complicated
empirical question that depends on local market conditions." And
whether such increases would be worth incurring is equally
complicated, particularly if, as some research suggests, tenants
represented by legal aid attorneys typically have valid claims.5
Understaffed legal services offices have no reason to spend
substantial, scarce resources litigating the "marginal" or meritless
cases that critics' arguments assume.
Similar points could be made about other litigation that assertedly
hurts the poor more than it helps. For example, contesting the
expulsion of a disruptive student is not necessarily counterproductive;
it may sometimes force school districts to respect appropriate
procedural norms or to find more constructive solutions to
disciplinary issues. This is not to suggest that society in general or the
poor in particular would benefit if every potential claim were fully
litigated. But neither is ability to pay an effective way of screening
out meritless claims. And determining when the costs of legal
assistance exceed its benefits involves far more complex and
subjective judgments than critics or policymakers have acknowledged.
The simplistic sound bites that opponents launch against legal services
are seriously distorting public perceptions and policy priorities. To
preserve political support, LSC funded offices have tailored caseloads
to address opponents' concerns. Over two-thirds of federal resources
now target domestic violence and other family cases, which are the
most politically popular.59 As LSC President John McKay has
explained to local program directors, "We're trying to find programs
we do well that Congress is willing to fund."' While recognizing that
this strategy may be a "shallow way to do things," it appears necessary
to counteract legislative opposition.61
In the long run, however, this strategy inevitably risks compounding
the problem it seeks to address. Justifications for legal services that
stress only the needs of the "deserving poor" invite restrictions that
exclude all others. Why permit government-funded lawyers to pursue
their "left political agenda" through organizing and lobbying
activities, or assisting convicted felons and undocumented immigrants
when millions of impoverished American children still need basic
services? Yet it is politically unpopular groups whose legal rights are

57. Neil K. Komesar, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law: A Comparative
InstitutionalView, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 612, 613-14 (1984); Gunn, supra note 44, at 385-

86.
58. Gunn, supra note 44, at 420-21.
59. Janet Elliott, Repositioning LegalAid; New LeaderHopes Battered Moms Can
Rescue Poverty Law, Tex. Law., Mar. 16, 1998, at 1 (citing John McKay, President,

LSC).
60. Id. (quoting John McKay, President, LSC).
61. Id. (quoting John McKay, President, LSC).

2001]

ACCESS TO JUSTICE

1797

most vulnerable. When shut out of the courts, groups like immigrants
and prisoners have nowhere else to turn.62
Moreover, the direct personal services to the poor that Americans
find most acceptable do nothing to address the structural sources of
Current LSC
poverty, or to help the poor help themselves.
restrictions prohibit federally-funded lawyers from providing the very
kinds of assistance most likely to have structural impact: advocacy
before legislative and administrative tribunals, grass-roots community
organizing, and class-action litigation.63 These lawyers also may not
collect attorneys' fees, which removes an effective deterrent to future
abuses and a crucial funding source for other work.64 Nor may
programs that receive federal support use other sources of funding to
pursue cases that LSC guidelines exclude.65 Taken together, these
restrictions hobble the ability of legal services lawyers to address the
causes as well as symptoms of poverty. By expanding "access to
justice" only on these terms, legal assistance may foster the illusion
that "justice" has been done when underlying problems remain
unsolved.
What constitutes the appropriate balance between impact and
service work has been a matter of longstanding debate within the legal
services community and need not be revisited in detail here. The
point is simply that current restrictions have inappropriately skewed
the balance. They prevent lawyers from effectively addressing
common problems or from helping to organize community efforts that
will. And such restrictions are likely to persist unless we can do better
in persuading the public-or the courts-of the importance of
adequate access to justice in practice as well as principle.
IV.

JUDICIAL FAILURES
Illinois,66 the Supreme

Court observed that
In 1956, in Griffin v.
"[tihere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. '67 Over the next half
century, American courts have repeatedly witnessed the truth of that
observation, and have repeatedly failed to address it. These failures
have occurred along multiple dimensions. Courts have declined to
recognize a right to appointed counsel in civil cases except under
highly limited circumstances. In the civil and criminal proceedings
where courts have recognized a right to assistance, they have failed to
insure that representation meets acceptable standards. Judicial
oversight has been equally lacking for the substantive and financial
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See generally Leven, supra note 1.
45 C.F.R. §§ 1612, 1617 (1999).
Id. § 1642.
Id. § 1610.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 19.
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restrictions that legislatures have established for legal services. And
despite the overwhelming shortages of affordable or governmentsubsidized legal assistance, courts have failed to establish structures
that would enable most Americans to represent themselves
effectively.
One cluster of problems arises from limited judicial interpretations
of the constitutional right to counsel. Over the last seventy-five years,
courts have gradually extended requirements of lawyers for indigent
criminal defendants. Those requirements for federal prosecutions
have been grounded in the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel,
and for state prosecutions, in the Fourteenth Amendment due process
and equal protection clauses.68 Both lines of decisions build on the
same commonsense insight expressed in the Court's 1932 Powell v.
Alabama ruling: "the right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 69
However, the Court has largely failed to extend that insight to civil
contexts where similarly fundamental interests are at issue. In
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court
interpreted the due process clause to require appointment of counsel
in civil cases if the proceeding would otherwise prove fundamentally
unfair.7" In making that determination, courts should consider three
basic factors: "the private interests at stake, the government's
interest, and the risk that [lack of counsel] will lead to an erroneous
decision."7 Under this standard, a majority of Justices found no
reversible error in Lassiter.72 There, an incarcerated woman lost
parental rights after a hearing at which she lacked assistance of
counsel.73 In the majority's view, such assistance would not have
made a "determinative difference," given the state's strong factual
case and the absence of "troublesome points of law. '74 Lower courts
have proven similarly reluctant to require lawyers in civil contexts.75
68. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). But see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (finding no right to counsel
in optional post-conviction proceedings).
69. 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
70. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
71. Id. at 27, 31.
72. Id. at 33.
73. Id. at 20-22.
74. Id. at 32-33.
75. In summarizing these cases, Laurence Tribe concludes:
The states are required to subsidize the most basic civil litigation costs of
indigents only when: the state has a complete monopoly on resolution of the
dispute, a fundamental interest is at stake, and the resulting financial burden
on the state treasury would be light. Because these decisions contain so
many escape hatches for a judiciary not particularly familiar with the plight
of the dispossessed and understandably hesitant to spend the states'
revenues, the [Fjourteenth [A]mendment provides only modest relief for
poor people who seek a day in court.
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And in the exceptional cases where they have appointed counsel, they

have often failed to ensure compensation.76
This reluctance is problematic on several grounds. Some civil
implicate interests as significant as those at issue in many
proceedings
minor criminal
proceedings where counsel is required. It is a cruel
irony that, in domestic violence cases, defendants who face little risk
of significant sanctions are entitled to counsel, while victims whose

lives are at risk are expected to seek legal protection without legal
assistance. 7 The rationale for subsidized representation seems
particularly strong in cases like Lassiter,where crucial interests are at
issue, legal standards are imprecise and subjective, proceedings are
formal and adversarial, and resources between the parties are grossly
imbalanced.78 Under such circumstances, opportunities for legal
assistance are crucial to the legitimacy of the justice system. As the
Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts, the "right to sue and
defend" is a right "conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government."79 Providing representation that
will make that right meaningful fosters values central to our concept
of a just society. Not only does it serve the instrumental function
noted in Lassiter of preventing erroneous decisions, but it also affirms
interests of human dignity that are core democratic ideals. As Frank
Michelman has argued, the opportunity to litigate effectively
promotes "self-respect" and a sense of "hav[ing one's] will[] 'counted'
in societal decisions."80
Not only has the judiciary failed to institutionalize those values in
civil contexts, it has trivialized their meaning in criminal cases. Judges
routinely fail to ensure effective assistance of counsel, and sometimes
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1652 (2d ed. 1988). For a recent
example, see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
76. In Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1976), the California Supreme
Court held that a prisoner seeking to defend a civil action but unable to appear in
court personally should be entitled to counsel if a continuance was not feasible, if his
property interests would be affected, and if an attorney would be helpful. A decade
later, in Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 583 (Cal. 1985), the court reaffirmed
Payne but reserved the issue of how to compensate court-appointed counsel in the
hopes that the legislature, bar and other interested groups would find a solution. That
solution was not forthcoming. See Philip Carrizosa, Yarbrough Case Still Awaits TrialBy Free Lawyer, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 16, 1987, at 1.
77. "Two-thirds of battering complaints are classified as simple misdemeanors,
even though most involve serious injuries in recently surveyed cities, fewer than
[10%] of men arrested for domestic assault serve any jail time." Deborah L Rhode,
Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality 112 (1997) (citing studies). Onehalf of all interspousal homicides and most serious injuries occur after victims attempt
to separate from their abusers. Id. at 114; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,90 Mich. L Rev. 1,64-65 (1991).
78. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 35-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
79. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
80. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and LitigationAccess Fees: The Right
to ProtectOne's Rights-PartI, 1973 Duke LJ. 1153, 1172.
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actively work against it. Too many courts appoint lawyers based not
on ability but on personal ties, campaign contributions, and
willingness to dispose of cases quickly, without time-consuming
motions or trials.81 In theory, inadequate representation could trigger
malpractice remedies. In fact, such remedies are almost never
forthcoming, because convicted criminals are unsympathetic plaintiffs
and prevailing doctrine denies recovery unless they can prove their
innocence or have their convictions set aside.' And only in the most
egregious cases will courts reverse convictions for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Trial judges have declined to find inadequate
representation where attorneys were drunk, on drugs, suffering from

severe mental illness, or parking their car during key parts of the
prosecution's case.83 Convictions have been upheld where lawyers
spent less time preparing for trial than the average American spends
showering before work." And defendants have been executed despite
their lawyers' lack of any prior trial experience, ignorance of all
relevant death penalty precedents, or failure to present any mitigating
evidence." One systematic survey found that over 99% of federal
ineffective-assistance claims were unsuccessful. 86

The extent of judicial tolerance is well-illustrated by a recent Texas
case. There, counsel for a defendant facing the death penalty fell
asleep several times during witness testimony that he found "boring"
and spent only about five hours preparing for trial.87 In rejecting
claims of inadequate representation, the Texas court reasoned that
the decision to sleep might have been a "strategic" ploy to gain
sympathy from the jury.s8 And a federal judge reviewing that decision
81. Robert Sherrill, Death Trip: The American Way of Execution, The Nation,
Jan. 8,2001, at 13.
82. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 5.6 (1986); John Leubsdorf,
Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 101, 111-19
(1995); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1998); see generally
Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 3 Legal Malpractice § 25.3 (4th ed. 1996); cf
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 75 cmt. d (Proposed Final
Draft No. 2, Apr. 6, 1998).
83. Bright, Counsel for the Poor,supra note 17, at 1835; Cole, supra note 14, at 87;
Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of 'Counsel' in the Sixth Amendment, 78
Iowa L. Rev. 433, 499-501 (1993); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death,
100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2104-06; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the
Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 137 (1986); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1957-58 (1992);
Stephen B. Bright, Sleeping on the Job, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at A26 [hereinafter
Bright, Sleeping].
84. Bright, Sleeping, supra note 83.
85. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor,supra note 17, at 1837-41; Cole, supra note
14, at 87; Green, supra note 83, at 433; Death Watch, The Nation, Nov. 20,2000, at 3.
86. Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna, FederalHabeas Corpus Review of State
Court Convictions, 31 Cal. W. L. Rev. 237,259-60 (1995).
87. Herbert, supra note 14; Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, The
Nation, Apr. 7, 1997, at 27.
88. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en
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maintained that "[t]he Constitution says that everyone's entitled to an
attorney of their choice. But the Constitution does not say that the
lawyer has to be awake." 89 Other courts agree. Instances of
courtroom napping are sufficiently common that an entire
jurisprudence has developed to determine how much dozing is
constitutionally permissible. Some courts even apply a three-step
analysis: did counsel sleep for repeated and prolonged periods; was
counsel actually unconscious; and were crucial defense interests at
stake while counsel was asleep?9" According to some prosecutors and
judges, it would set a dangerous precedent if defendants were entitled
to a new trial merely because their lawyers slept through substantial
parts of their first.91

Not only have courts been reluctant to set aside convictions for
ineffective assistance of counsel, they have been equally unwilling to
address the financial and caseload pressures that produce it.
Challenges to inadequate statutory fees for private attorneys and
excessive assignments for public defenders have rarely been
successful. 2 Indeed, judges, who face crushing caseloads of their own,
often have been reluctant to encourage effective advocacy that would
result in more time-consuming trials and pretrial matters 3 Yet in the
long run, the judiciary's tolerance of insufficient resources for indigent
representation ill-serves its own as well as societal interests. The
errors resulting from unqualified or unprepared defense counsel are a
leading cause of erroneous convictions and reversals on appeal.'
Courts have also largely acquiesced in the restrictions that Congress
has placed on federal funds for legal services, despite their corrosive
effects on constitutionally protected interests. In the most recent
banc).
89. Shapiro, supra note 87 (quoting Judge Shaver).
90. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687-90 (2d Cir. 1996); Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F.
Supp. 2d 854, 863-66 (S.D. Tex. 1999), reh'g en banc granted, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
31036 (5th Cir. 2000).
91. Henry Weinstein, Condemned Man Awaits Fate in Dozing Lawyer Case, LA.
Times, June 6,2000, at Al.

92. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 435-36 (1990)
(finding that boycott of court-appointed cases by private defense attorneys seeking
higher compensation constituted an antitrust violation); cf Frances A. McMorris,
Giuliani'sHard Line Breaks Strike at New York City Legal Services, Wall St. J., Oct.
6, 1994, at Bll. The efforts continue. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Pataki, No.
1029872000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Apr. 7,2000).
93. See generally McConville & Mirsky, supra note 24; see also Schulhofer, supra
note 22, at 1990; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 83, at 1959; Sara Rimer & Raymond
Bonner, Texas Lawyer's Death Row Record a Concern, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2000, at
Al (noting judges' preference for lawyers who "moved cases quickly").

94. See Dwyer, Neufield & Sheck, supra note 15, at 263 (finding that 27% of cases

exonerating defendants through DNA evidence involved attorneys' incompetence);
Fox Butterfield, Death Sentences Being Overturned in 2 of 3 Appeals, N.Y. Times,
June 12, 2000, at Al (noting findings of Columbia Law School study in which two of
three capital convictions were overturned, and 37% of the reversals were the product
of defense-attorney incompetence).
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round of challenges, both the Ninth and Second Circuits rejected
claims that these restrictions impermissibly burdened clients' due
process or First Amendment rights.' Under the appellate courts'
analyses, these limitations imposed no unconstitutional conditions on
the receipt of federal funds because LSC organizations had alternative
channels to pursue protected activities. Legal aid offices could create
affiliated organizations to engage in restricted activities as long as they
used separate funds, personnel, and facilities. 6 In the courts' view,
any burdens encountered by LSC clients simply left them in the same
position that they would have occupied if Congress had never created
the LSC. Claims that the restrictions impermissibly interfered with
recipients' lawyer-client relationships were also rejected on the
ground that this relationship enjoys no special constitutional
protection from governmental regulation.'
And challenges to
prohibitions on activities involving welfare reform were largely
dismissed on the theory that such limitations were viewpoint-neutral;
they applied to efforts seeking to defend as well as challenge welfare
legislation.9"
Only one limitation failed to survive both courts' scrutiny. The
Second Circuit, but not the Ninth, struck down the "suits for benefits"
provision that permits a legal services office to represent a client
seeking relief from a welfare agency only if the claim does not involve
a challenge to existing law. This, in the Second Circuit's view,
constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment, and the Supreme Court has agreed.99
Although this is not the occasion for an extended analysis of
relevant constitutional doctrine, a few brief points bear emphasis. It is
true, of course, that the plaintiffs in these cases were no worse off as a
result of the restrictions than they would have been if the government
had never provided funding. But that is often true in cases where the
Supreme Court has found unconstitutional conditions; the point of the
doctrine is to require the government to respect constitutional rights if
it chooses to provide assistance. Once Congress decides to subsidize
certain attorney-client relationships, it should not be permitted to
undermine their effectiveness. Foreclosing strategies like class
actions, requests for attorneys' fees, or legislative advocacy often have
that effect.
In many jurisdictions, no non-federally funded
organizations are available to pursue federally-restricted activities. 1'0
95. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1553, argued on Oct. 4,2000; Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
145 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1015 (1998).
96. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 766-67; Legal Aid Soc'y, 145 F.3d at 1024-27.
97. Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 764-65.
98. Id. at 768-69.
99. Id. at 773; Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez,

__

U.S.

(2000).

100. See Legal Servs. Corp., supra note 1, at 8; see generally David S. Udell, The
Legal Services Restrictions: Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia and Oregon
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And no federally funded program has yet found it economically
feasible to establish a separate affiliate that would be permitted to
engage in such activities. 10 1
Moreover, contrary to the appellate courts' implication, the
attorney-client relationship has long been recognized to serve crucial
constitutional values of expression and association. 1 2 Current LSC
restrictions undercut those values and compromise lawyers' ethical
obligations to serve their clients' best interests. For example, it is
usually advantageous for plaintiffs with similar claims to pursue them
as class actions, since such collective efforts offer broader relief,
higher stakes and visibility, and greater bargaining leverage.-' By
foreclosing such strategies, LSC restrictions impair lawyers' ethical
obligations to provide effective representation and to exercise
independent professional judgment about what that representation
requires. 10 Of course, attorneys can decline representation or ask a
client's permission to limit its scope when they believe that their
advocacy would be compromised.'O But it will not always be
apparent at the outset of representation whether certain strategies are
necessary to advance a client's objectives. Nor will it always be
possible to find alternative counsel to accept the case from the outset,
or to take it over if a conflict develops between federal regulations
and client interests.0 6 Lawyers for the poor should not be forced to
choose between betraying their ethical obligations and forfeiting
essential funds.

Describethe Costs, 17 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 337 (1998).
101. Cf Brief of Amici Curiae N.Y. State Bar Ass'n et al. at 23-25, Legal Servs.
Corp. v. Velazquez, U.S. - (2000) (Nos. 99-603 & 99-960); Udell, supra note
100, at 351-55.
102- See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
103. See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Left Out in the Cold: How Clients Are Affected
by Restrictions on Their Legal Services Lawyers (2000); Made A. Failinger & Larry
May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 Ohio
St. L.. 1, 17-18 (1984); see generally Deborah Hensler et al., Class Action Dilemmas:
Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain 533 (2000).
104. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.1 (1983) (requiring competent
representation); Id. R. 5.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from permitting a person who
"pays the lawyer to render services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgement in rendering such legal services"); see Symposium, Ethical
Issues Panel, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 357, 374-81 (1998) (comments of Stephen
Ellmann); id. at 368-71 (comments of Emily J. Sack); see also Samuel J. Levine, Legal
Services Lawyers and the Influence of Third Partieson the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
Some Thoughts from Scholars, Practitioners,and Courts, 67 Fordham L Rev. 2319,
2330-31 (1999).
105. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2(e) (1983) (advising a lawyer to "consult
with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct").
106. Udell, supra note 100, at 339; Ethical Issues Panel, supra note 104, at 368
(comments of Sack). But see Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the
Ethical Practiceof Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2187,2235 (1999).
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It is also unrealistic to view the restrictions related to welfare
reform as viewpoint-neutral simply because they apply to advocacy on
either side of the issue. As a practical matter, those clients poor
enough to qualify for legal services will not be found on both sides of
welfare disputes. In purpose and effect, LSC restrictions foreclose
arguments challenging eligibility limitations, not arguments seeking to
sustain them. And as courts have recognized in other contexts, the
constitutionality of conditions on speech should be assessed in light of
their actual, not theoretical, impact. 10 7 From that perspective, the
Court was clearly correct in striking down the restriction for the
reason that Justice Souter noted at oral argument: "There's something
very risky going on when the government's policy in effect says, you
can't make an argument that disagrees with the government."''0 8
Finally, and most disturbingly, courts have failed to address the
effects of their own procedural choices in obstructing access to justice.
Whatever the justifications for deferring to legislative priorities
concerning legal services, no such excuses explain the barriers to selfrepresentation and low-cost assistance created by the judiciary's own
rules and practices. On issues like procedural simplification, pro se
assistance, and nonlawyer services, courts have too often been part of
the problem, not the solution.
In "poor peoples' courts" that handle housing, bankruptcy, small
claims, and family matters, parties without lawyers are less the
exception than the rule. Cases in which at least one side is
unrepresented are far more common than those in which both sides
have counsel. 10 9 In some of these courts, over four-fifths of the
proceedings involve pro se litigants." 0 Yet the systems in which these
parties operate have been designed by and for lawyers, and courts
have done far too little to make them accessible to the average
claimant.
Innovative projects and reform proposals are not in short supply.
Examples include: procedural simplification; standardized forms;
increased educational materials; self-service centers with interactive
kiosks for information and document preparation; free in-person
assistance from volunteer lawyers or court personnel; and judicial
107. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
108. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,

-

U.S.

_

. Tony Mauro, Free to Argue,

Am. Law., Nov. 2000, at 67, 69 (quoting Justice Souter).
109. Russell Engler, And Justice For All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987,
1987 (1999) [hereinafter Engler, Justice for All]; see also Jona Goldschmidt, How Are
Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, 82 Judicature 13 (July/Aug. 1998) [hereinafter
Goldschmidt, Litigants];Maryland Report, supra note 1, at 25-26.
110. Engler, Justicefor All, supra note 109, at 2047; Goldschmidt, Litigants, supra
note 109, at 13; see also Jona Goldschmidt et al., Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se
Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and Court Managers (1998); Robert
B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 28 Fam. L.Q. 407, 408 (1994).
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intervention to prevent manifest injustice."'

Yet few jurisdictions

have attempted systematic implementation of such reforms.

A

majority of surveyed courts has no formal pro se assistance services.1"2

Many of the services that are available are unusable by those who
need help most: uneducated litigants with limited competence and

English language skills.1 3 All too often, these litigants are expected to

navigate procedures of bewildering complexity, and to complete forms

with archaic jargon left over from medieval English pleadings"
Court clerks and mediators are instructed not to give legal advice,

since that would constitute "unauthorized practice of law.""' Even
pro se facilitators are cautioned against answering any "should"
questions, such as "which form should I file?""'
Judges vary considerably in their willingness to fill the gaps and to
assist unrepresented parties. Less than 10% of surveyed courts have
any established policies on point."7 While some judges attempt to
prevent exploitation of the ignorance of pro se litigants, others decline
to do so out of concern that such efforts will compromise their
impartiality or encourage more individuals to proceed without

111. Family Law Section Comm. on the Probate and Family Court, Mass. Bar
Ass'n, Changing the Culture of the Probate and Family Court 29 (1997) [hereinafter
Changing the Culture]; Standing Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Services, ABA,
Responding to the Needs of the Self-Represented Divorce Litigant 12-38 (1994);
Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 531 (1994); Engler, Justicefor All, supra note 109, at 2049; Goldschmidt,
Litigants, supranote 109, at 20-22; Yegge, supra note 110, at 413-17.
112. See Goldschmidt, Litigants, supra note 109, at 20.
113. Lillian C. Henry & Gillian N. Bush, California's Family Law Facilitatorand
Arizona's Self-Service Center: Success and Limitations of Two Systems Designed to
Meet the Challenges of Legal Services (1999) (unpublished paper, Stanford Law
School on file with author); see also Elizabeth McCulloch, Let Me Show You How:
ProSe Divorce Courses and Client Power,48 Fla. L. Rev. 481,483 (1996) (stating that
only 44% of surveyed participants in a pro se divorce assistance program had
obtained a divorce); Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self Representation a Reasonable
Alternative to Attorney Representationin Divorce Cases?, 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 553, 563
& n.51 (1992) (finding that most of surveyed pro se divorce litigants had some college
education).
114. Engler, Justicefor All, supra note 109, at 2060, 2064; Erica L Fox, Alone in the
Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 Harv. Negot. L.
Rev. 85, 92 (1996); see Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Partiesfrom the
Law: Designingan Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/TenantMediation,
1997 J. Disp. Resol. 53,70.
115. Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, Breaking New Ground 2 (1997); Engler,
Justice for All, supra note 109, at 2056, 2060, 2064; John M. Greacen, "No Legal
Advice from Court Personnel":What Does That Mean?, Judges' J., Winter 1995, at 10,
10-12; Kurtzberg & Henikoff, supra note 114, at 90; 80 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 95-056
(Dec. 19,1995) [hereinafter Md. Op.].
116. Md. Op., supra note 115; Henry & Bush, supra note 113.
117. Jona Goldschmidt, How are Judges and Courts Coping with Pro Se Litigants?:
Results from a Survey of Judges and Court Managers 16 (May 1997) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author), cited in Engler, Justice for All, supra note 109, at
2013.
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lawyers. 118 Some courts are openly hostile to unrepresented parties,
whom they view as tying up the system or attempting to gain tactical
advantages. 19 Even the most sympathetic judges often have been
unwilling to push for reforms that will antagonize lawyers whose
economic interests are threatened by pro se assistance and whose
support is critical to judges' own effectiveness, election campaigns,
and advancement.
Similar considerations have worked against efforts to broaden
access through nonlawyer providers of legal services. Almost all the
scholarly experts and bar commissions that have studied the issue
have recommended increased opportunities
for nonlawyer
assistance.120 Almost all the major judicial rulings on the issue have
ignored those recommendations.
Current bans on unauthorized
practice of law by lay competitors are sweeping in scope and
unsupportable in practice. Nonlawyers who engage in law-related
activities are subject to criminal prohibitions that are inconsistently
12 1
interpreted, unevenly enforced, and inappropriately applied.
The dominant approach is to prohibit individuals who are not
members of the state bar from providing personalized legal services.
For example, independent paralegals may type documents but may
not answer even the simplest legal questions.2
Yet comparative
research finds that nonlawyer specialists are generally at least as
qualified as lawyers to provide assistance on routine matters where
legal needs are greatest.Y2 Such results should come as no surprise.
118. Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); Changing the Culture, supra
note 111, at 51; Engler, Justice for All, supra note 109, at 2012-15; Goldschmidt,
Litigants, supra note 109, at 19.
119. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 662
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (Barry, J., dissenting); Monitoring Subcomm., City Wide Task
Force on Hous. Courts, 5 Minute Justice or "Ain't Nothing Going on But the Rent",
65-68 (1986); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:Participationand Subordinationof
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process,20 Hofstra L. Rev. 533, 566-75 (1992); Engler,
supra note 109, at 2014, 2016.
120. For scholars' views, see the sources cited in Deborah L. Rhode,
Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 701 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism];and
Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Nonlawyers, 4 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 209 (1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Legal Services]. For other experts' views, see
ABA Comm. on Nonlawyer Practice, Nonlawyer Activity in Law-Related Situations:
A Report With Recommendations (1995); and Cal. State Bar, Comm'n on Legal
Technician's Report (1990) [hereinafter Technician's Report].
121. See generally Rhode, Legal Services, supra note 120.
122. Fifteenth Judicial Dist. Unified Bar Ass'n v. Glasgow, 1999 WL 1128847, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. (1983); Deborah L.
Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 670-73 (2d ed. 1995); Debra Baker, Is This
Woman a Threat to Lawyers?, 85 A.B.A. J. 54 (1999).
123. See In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the S.C. Bar, 422
S.E.2d 123, 124-25 (S.C. 1992); Technician's Report, supra note 120, at 41; Judith
Citron, The Citizens Advice Bureau: For the Community, By the Community (1989);
Herbert Kritzer, Legal Advocacy 193-203 (1998); Matthew A. Melone, Income Tax
Practice and Certified Public Accountants: The Case for a Status Based Exemption
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Law schools generally do not teach, and bar exams do not test, the

specialized information involved in dealing with divorces, landlordtenant disputes, bankruptcy, immigration, welfare, and similar claims.
Yet performance-related considerations are irrelevant under
prevailing case law, which focuses only on whether nonlawyers are
providing legal assistance, not on whether they are doing so
effectively. While courts have justifiable concerns about unqualified
or unethical lay assistance, these abuses are not the only targets of
unauthorized-practice doctrine. As the discussion below indicates,
they could be addressed through more narrowly124 drawn prohibitions
and licensing structures for nonlawyer providers.
A final area of judicial abdication involves pro bono service. The
scope of judicial power to require lawyers to provide unpaid legal

assistance remains unsettled, largely because the power has so rarely
been exercised. The Supreme Court has never spoken directly to the
point, although its dicta and summary dismissals imply that courts
have inherent authority to impose such requirements, at least for
criminal cases. 121 Lower court decisions are mixed, but some have
concluded that requiring unpaid service constitutes an abuse of
authority or a violation of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits
taking property without just compensation." - Such decisions are
difficult to reconcile with Supreme Court precedents, which hold that
"the Fifth Amendment does not require that the Government pay for
the performance of a public duty it is already owed.""I As long as the
required amount of service is not unreasonable, takings claims

From State Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 11 Akron Tax J.47 (1995); Rhode,
Legal Services, supra note 120; Rhode, Professionalism,supra note 120. In the one
reported survey of consumer satisfaction, nonlawyers rated higher than lawyers.
Rhode, Legal Services, supra note 120, at 230-31; see also Yegge, supra note 110, at
418.
124. For examples of such proposals, see sources cited in Rhode, Professionalism,
supra note 120, at 715 & n.57; and Technician's Report, supra note 120.
125. In Sparks v. Parker,368 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1979), the Alabama Supreme Court
upheld an assignment system for indigent criminal defense, which the United States
Supreme Court summarily dismissed on appeal. Sparks v. Parker, 444 U.S. 803 (1979).
And, in earlier cases, the Court concluded that attorneys, as "officers of the court,"
are "bound to render service when required." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73
(1932); see also Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (finding no
statutory authority for court to compel appointment and reserving issue of inherent
authority).
126. Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding reporting
requirement); Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Neb. 1995)
(finding inherent authority to compel lawyer's representation of a civil plaintiff if
other lawyers rejected representation because of the plaintiff's indigency); Zambia v.
Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Ariz. 1996); DeLisio v. Alaska Super. Court, 740 P.2d 437,
442 (Alaska 1987); McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 15-17 (Iowa 1982).
127. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588 (1973). The Court cited with
approval United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), which upheld
required service. Hurtado,410 U.S. at 589.
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generally have failed. And there is ample support in Supreme Court
decisions for viewing pro bono assistance as a public duty.'
Not only has the judiciary been unwilling to mandate such
assistance in individual cases, it has failed to adopt ethical rules
requiring lawyers to provide annual pro bono service.
Proposed requirements have come and gone, but mainly have
gone. 129 State supreme courts have adopted only aspirational
standards, coupled in at least one jurisdiction with voluntary or
mandatory reporting systems.130 As the discussion below notes, most
lawyers have failed to meet these aspirational goals, and the
performance of the profession as a whole remains at shameful levels.
Given bar resistance to pro bono obligations and legislative
resistance to adequate funding for legal services, the judiciary's
acquiescence in distributional inequalities is surely understandable.
As Geoffrey Hazard has noted, no "politically sober judge, however
anguished by injustice unfolding before her eyes," could welcome the
battles involved in trying to establish some broadly enforceable right
to effective assistance of counsel. 13' But the political obstacles and
passive virtues that justify caution do not justify abdication. 3 2 And as
the concluding section of this article suggests, the judiciary has both
the opportunity and the obligation to narrow the gap between equal
protection principles and practices.
V. FAILURES OF THE BAR

Access to justice is a favorite theme in bar rhetoric but a low
priority in reform agendas. The gap between rhetoric and reality is
particularly apparent in two contexts: commitments to pro bono
service and rules affecting unauthorized practice and unrepresented
parties.
Bar ethical codes and commentary have long maintained that
lawyers have an obligation to assist those who cannot afford
counsel.'33 And bar leaders have long waxed eloquent in describing
the "quiet heroism" of the profession in discharging that
responsibility."
According to ABA executive director Robert A.
128. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
129. See Comm. on Pro Bono and Legal Servs., Proposal to Chief Judge Judith
Kaye for an Attorney Pro Bono Reporting Requirement, 52 N.Y.C. B. Ass'n Rec. 367
(1997); Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to
the Right Question, 49 Md. L. Rev. 78,97-99 (1990).
130. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 1-3.1(a) and Rules of
Judicial Admin. 2.065 (Legal Aid), 630 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1993).
131. Hazard, supra note 4, at 380.
132. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962).
133. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.1 (1983); Model Code of Prof'i
Responsibility EC 2-25, 8-3 (1981).
134. Robert L. Haig, Lawyer-Bashing: Have We Earned It?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19,
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Stein, "The Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge issued to [large] law firms
has resulted in more than three million hours of donated services
annually! This is an extraordinary accomplishment in which all ABA
members can take great pride." 35 A constant refrain among bar
leaders is that "no other profession... is as charitable with its time
and money.""

Such claims suggest more about the profession's capacity for self-

delusion than self-sacrifice.

The bar has consistently refused to

require pro bono assistance and the limited data available suggest that
most lawyers' voluntary contributions are minimal.',
Full
information is difficult to come by, because only one state (Florida)
mandates reporting of contribution levels, and because many lawyers
take liberties with the definition of "pro bono" and include any
uncompensated or undercompensated work.'However, recent
surveys indicate that most lawyers provide no significant pro bono
assistance to the poor. In states that claim to have "model" programs,
involvement ranges from a high of 47% in New York to 15-18% in
Texas, Minnesota, Michigan and Florida. Contributions by volunteers
ranged from an average of forty-two hours per year in New York to a
median of twenty hours in Texas.'39 Less than 10% of practitioners
1993, at 2.
135. Robert A. Stein, Leader of the Pro Bono Pack, 83 A.B.A. J. 108 (1997); see
also Jerome J. Shestack, The Pro Bono Principle,84 A.B.A. J. 8 (1998) (noting that
the profession can "rightfully boast" about its pro bono challenge).
136. Haig, supra note 134; see also James C. Moore, Legal Services for the Poor
The Unfulfilled Responsibility of An Affluent Society, Remarks at the Nat'l Press
Club (Oct. 14, 1998) ("I can think of no other profession that acts as responsibly
towards those who need its help as does the legal profession.").
137. For the most recent refusal to recommend mandatory pro bono, see
Mandatory Pro Bono Idea Loses Steam at Ethics2000 Commission's FinalHearing, 16
ABAIBNA Manual on Prof. Conduct 370 (2000).
138. See Carroll Seron, The Business of Practicing Law 129-33 (1996); Deborah L
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 2415, 2423 (1999) [hereinafter Rhode, Cultures of Commitment].
Less than one-half of New York lawyers provide pro bono services, and of these,
three-quarters provided free legal services for a friend or relative, and about twothirds provided services for a client who could not pay. Only 14% (slightly over 7%
of all New York lawyers) took referrals from bar pro bono programs. Gary Spencer,
Pro Bono Data Show Little Improvement, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1999, at 1; see also Denise
R. Johnson, The Legal Needs of the Poor As a StartingPoint for Systemic Reform, 17
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 479, 480 n.6 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Legal Needs] (citing
research indicating that only 10% of New York lawyers provide legal services to the
poor); Judith L. Maute, Pro Bono in Oklahoma: Time for Change, 54 Okla. L Rev.
(forthcoming Spring 2001).
139. For Texas' "model" program, see Tex. State Bar, Civil Legal Services to the
Poor in Texas, Report to the Supreme Court of Texas, at 200 (2000), available at
http://www.texasbar.com/attyinfo/probonollegpoor.htm.
For New York's "model"
program, see N.Y. State Unified Court System, Report on the Pro Bono Activities of
the New York State Bar, available at http'J/www.courts.state.ny.usf
probono/pbrpt.htm. For praise of New York's approach, see Moore, supra note 136.
For Michigan's approach, see Candace Crowley and Al Butzbaugh, State Bar
Coordinates Private Endowment and Operations Funding for Civil Legal Aid, 78

1810

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

accept referrals from federally-funded legal aid offices or bar-

sponsored poverty-related programs. 140

Most lawyers are no more

charitable with their money than their time. Reported financial
contributions range from an average of $82 per year in New York to
$32 per year in Florida.1 41 In short, the best available research finds
that the American legal profession averages less than half an hour of
work per week and under half a dollar per day in support of legal
services for the poor.
Pro bono programs involving the profession's most affluent
members reflect a particularly dispiriting distance between the bar's
idealized image and actual practices. In Silicon Valley, the heartland
of salary hikes, no firm now manages to meet the modest thirty hours
per year average that used to be the accepted minimum. 4 2 Only a
third of the nation's large law firms have committed themselves to
meet the ABA's Pro Bono Challenge, which requires contributions
equivalent to 3-5% of gross revenues. 43 And only eighteen of the
nation's 100 most financially successful firms meet the ABA's
standard of hours per year of pro bono service." The approximately
50,000 lawyers at these firms averaged eight minutes per day on pro
bono activities.14 5
When measured against lawyers' capacity to give, these
contribution levels should scarcely be a matter of "great pride."' 46
Law is among the nation's highest paying occupations, yet many of its
top earners are making only nominal contributions. Although recent
salary wars have pushed compensation levels to new heights, this
Mich. B.J. 1094, 1095 (1999). For Minnesota's approach, described as one of the
"best" in the country, see David E. Rovella, Can the Bar Fill the LSC's Shoes?, Nat'l.
L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at Al (quoting Esther Lardent). For Florida's approach, see
Talbot D'Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, 25 Fla. St. U.
L. Rev. 631 (1998).
140. LSC Statistics: Private Attorney Involvement, All Programs, available at
http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/pr._pai.htm; see Spencer, supra note 138.
141. N.Y. State Unified Court System, supra note 139; D'Alemberte, supra note
139; Access to the Legal System (July 1999), http://www.Flabar.org/newflabar/
publicmediainfolTBFNews (indicating that Florida lawyers contributed $1,861,627
between July 1, 1997, and June 30, 1998); Interview with Mildred Wilson, Fla. State
Bar Membership Office (2000) (indicating that in December, 1998, the Florida bar
had 58,789 members.) A "Generous Associates" campaign by the Washington, D.C.,
Legal Services Office has attempted to respond to recent cutbacks in pro bono. Such
cutbacks have been encouraged by salary hikes advocated on the "Greedy
Associates" website. The 2000 campaign generated only about $175,000. Joseph C.
Zengerle, Everybody Loses Without Pro Bono, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 30,2000, at A20.
142. Katrina M. Dewey, Of Porsches and Philanthropists,Cal. Law., Oct. 2000, at
96.
143. Interview with Esther Lardent, Pro Bono Institute (2000).
144. Aric Press, Eight Minutes, Am. Law., July 2000, at 13.
145. Press Release, Judicial Council of California, Chief Justice Urges More
Lawyers to Donate Time to Pro Bono Efforts, Sept. 16, 2000, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/newsreleases/NR52-00.htm.
146. See Stein, supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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affluence has eroded, rather than expanded, support for pro bono
programs. 147 Over the past decade, the average revenues of the most
successful firms increased by over 50%, while the average pro bono
hours declined by a third. 14 As one attorney summarized the
prevailing view: "It doesn't seem reasonable to expect [a] lawyer to
reduce his billable time or his leisure time [in order to do unpaid
work]. I don't know what the average lawyer earns but my guess is
the lawyer would answer: not enough." 49
Efforts to increase the profession's public service commitments
have met with both moral and practical objections. Those objections
have been reviewed at length elsewhere, and need not be rehearsed at
length here.150 However, a few general observations about the
resistance to pro bono requirements bear at least brief note.
As a matter of principle, some lawyers insist that compulsory
charity is a contradiction in terms. From their perspective, requiring
service would undermine its moral significance and infringe lawyers'
own rights. If equal justice under law is a societal value, then society
as a whole should bear its cost. The poor have fundamental needs for
food and medical care, but we do not require grocers or physicians to
donate their help in meeting those needs. Why should lawyers'
responsibilities be greater?uI
There are several problems with this claim, beginning with its
assumption that pro bono service is "charity." As bar ethical codes
have long maintained, such assistance is not simply a philanthropic
exercise; it is also a professional responsibility. Lawyers have special
powers and special privileges that entail special obligations.
America's highly legalized culture makes legal assistance "essential to
virtually all projects of social import[ance]."' Attorneys in this
nation have a much more extensive and exclusive right to provide
147. Kate Ackley & Bryan Rund, Pro Bono: Casualy of Salary Wars?, Legal
Times, Apr. 10, 2000, at 1; Anthony Perez Cassino, Skyrocketing Pay and Public
Service, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 31, 2000, at 24; Mark Hansen, Trickle-away Economics?: Cost
of High First Year Salaries May Be Borne By Pro Bono Recipients, 86 A.B.A. J. 20
(2000); Roger Parloff, Too Rich To Give, Am. Law., Apr. 2000, at 15; Greg Winter,
Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor,N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,2000, at Al.
148. Press, supra note 144.
149. Letter from Jon Hoffheimer to Deborah L. Rhode (July 8, 1999) (on file with
author).
150. See generally Marvin E. Frankel, Proposal:A National Legal Service, 45 S.C.
L. Rev. 887 (1994); Lardent, supra note 129; Macey, supra note 48. Refer also to the
sources cited in Rhode, Cultures of Comnitment, supra note 138.
151. See Comm. to Improve the Availability of Legal Servs., Final Report to the
Chief Judge of the State of New York (1990) [hereinafter New York Report],
reprinted in 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 755, 782 (1991); Debra Baker, Mandating Good
Works: Colorado ProposalRequiring Pro Bono Draws Fire From Most Lawyers, 85
A.B.A. J. 22 (1999); Frankel, supra note 150, at 890. Refer also to the sources cited in
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 138, at 2419.
152. Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 1148, 1156 (1990).
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legal assistance than attorneys in other countries. 153 The American
bar has jealously guarded those prerogatives and its success in
restricting lay competition has helped to price services out of reach for
many consumers."5 Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable
to expect lawyers to make some pro bono contributions in return for
their privileged status. 155
Nor is it plausible to view a minimal requirement of service as a
violation of lawyers' rights: a form of "latent fascism," "economic
slavery," and "involuntary servitude. ' 156 There is clearly no doctrinal
basis for such claims and their moral foundations are equally weak. A
well-established line of precedent holds that constitutional
prohibitions of involuntary servitude extend only to physical restraints
or legal confinement, which are not the sanctions authorized by
mandatory pro bono programs.5 7 Nor does requiring the equivalent
of an hour per week of uncompensated assistance stand on the same
moral footing as slavery. Michael Millemann aptly observes:
It is surprising-surprising is a polite word-to hear some of the
most wealthy, unregulated, and successful entrepreneurs in the
modern economic world invoke the amendment that abolished
slavery to justify their refusal to provide a little legal158help to those,
who in today's society, are most like the freed slaves.
The pragmatic objections to pro bono obligations are more
plausible, but ultimately no more convincing. It is true, as critics note,
that having reluctant dilettantes dabble in poverty law is an expensive
way of providing what may sometimes be inadequate services. But
the question is always, "compared to what?" For many low-income
groups, some assistance will be better than none, which is their current
alternative. And as discussion below indicates, concerns of costeffectiveness could be readily addressed by two strategies: offering a
broad range of opportunities for participation coupled with
153. See Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice 136-37 (2000) [hereinafter
Rhode, Justice]; Andrew Boon & Jennifer Levin, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers
in England and Wales 55-59, 402 (1999); Citron, supra note 123; see also Christine
Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice 1-9 (1999).
154. See Rhode, Justice, supra note 153, at 136-38; see generally Rhode,
Professionalism,supra note 120.

155. Nor would it be inappropriate to expect comparable contributions from other
professionals who have similar monopolies over the provision of other critical
services.
156. For further discussion, see lawyers quoted in Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 610 (1985) [hereinafter Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives];Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty of
Public Service: More Than Charity?, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 367, 391 n.97 (1993-94); and
Michael J. Mazzone, Mandatory Pro Bono: Slavery in Disguise, Tex. Law., Oct. 22,

1990, at 22.
157. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); Buchanan v. City of
Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (6th Cir. 1996).
158. Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A PartialAnswer to
the Right Question, 49 Md.L.Rev. 18,70 (1990).
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educational programs and support structures; and allowing lawyers
unwilling or unable to provide direct service the option of substituting

cash assistance to legal aid providers. In the absence of experience
with mandatory pro bono programs, it cannot be assumed that their
costs would be prohibitive and their benefits inconsequential.5 9
At the very least, pro bono requirements would support attorneys

who would like to participate in public interest projects but who work
in organizations that have discouraged such participation. For many
lawyers, these projects would offer welcome opportunities to develop
new skills, obtain more trial experience, and enhance their contacts
and reputations in the community. Such opportunities, in the context
of causes to which attorneys were committed, would undoubtedly
prove more rewarding, personally and professionally, than much of
what now occupies their time."6 There is, moreover, broader value in
exposing all members of the bar to how the justice system functions,
or fails to function, for the have-nots. Such exposure may build
support for reform, and increase the accountability of "poor peoples'
courts" now accustomed to cutting procedural corners.'6
A similar point could be made about requiring pro bono service by
law students. Less than 10% of law schools now impose such
requirements, and most students graduate without pro bono legal
experience. 162 Issues concerning access to justice and public service
have been missing or marginal in core law school curricula, and bar
have done little to make such concerns an
accreditation standards
63
educational priority.

159. For such assumptions, see Macey, supra note 48; George M. Kraw, Pro Malo
Publico, S.F. Recorder, Aug. 25, 1999, at 4; and Gary G. Sackett, Dear Access to
Justice Task Force,11 Utah BJ. 22 (1998).
160. Steven Lubet & Cathryn Steward, A "Public Assets" Theory of Lawyers' Pro
Bono Obligations,145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1299 (1997).
161. See id at 1304-05. For example, Steven Lubet described how a Chicago court,
handling landlord, tenant, and collection matters, was suddenly transformed in the
presence of the city's most prominent lawyer: "It was as though we were now in a real
courtroom where justice, and people, mattered." Id. at 1305; see also Rhode, Cultures
of Conunitment,supra note 138, at 2420.
162. Ass'n of American Law Schools, The Report: Learning to Serve, availableat
http:lwww.aals.orglprobono/report.html; Rhode, Culturesof C'ommitment, supra note
138, at 2436,2433-43.
163. "[I]n 1996, the [ABA] amended its accreditation standards to call on schools
to 'encourage... students to participate in pro bono activities and provide
opportunities for them to do so."' Rhode, Cultures of Commitnent, supra note 138, at
2416 (quoting Recodification of Accreditation Standards 302 (1996) (omission in
original)). However, schools are not required to provide specific information about
how they comply with that standard or how many students participate. In the absence
of such accountability, many schools' performances leave much to be desired. About
one-third either have no legal pro bono programs or have programs in which less than
fifty students participate. Ass'n of American Law Schools. supra note 162.
The Association of American Law Schools has recently taken steps in the right
direction by forming a Commission and a Section on Pro Bono and Public Service,
and by sponsoring regional colloquia on access to justice. See Ass'n of American Law
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One final area in which the bar's record concerning access to justice
has been particularly troubling involves unrepresented parties. The
profession has both resisted efforts to provide qualified nonlawyer
assistance for such parties, and has tolerated exploitation of their
vulnerability by opponents.
The bar's opposition to unauthorized practice of law by lay
competitors has been chronicled elsewhere, and again the point is not
to replicate that discussion here but rather to highlight its implications
for access to justice. Bar leaders have long insisted that such
prohibitions are motivated solely by concerns to protect the public
rather than the profession. But virtually no experts, including the
ABA's own Commission on Nonlawyer Practice, share that view. 164
As noted earlier, most research finds that lay specialists can effectively
provide routine services where legal needs are greatest. For many of
these needs, retaining a lawyer is like "hir[ing] a surgeon to pierce an
ear."165 Other countries generally permit nonlawyers to give legal
advice and to provide assistance on routine matters, and no evidence
suggests that these lay specialists are inadequate. A case on point
involves Great Britain's Citizen's Advice Bureaus, which rely on
nonlawyer volunteers to provide effective low-cost assistance
involving some ten million matters yearly."6
Although bar leaders do not lack examples of unqualified or
unethical lay assistance, these abuses are not qualitatively different
than those arising from lawyers' misconduct. And as discussion below
indicates, the problems can be addressed through regulation, not
prohibition, of lay specialists. Yet the organized bar is moving in
precisely the opposite direction. At its meeting in February of 2000,
the ABA approved a resolution to increase enforcement of
unauthorized practice prohibitions, and some state and local bars have
launched similar efforts. 67

Schools, Equal Justice Project, http://www.aals.org/equaljustice/index.htm; Ass'n of
American Law Schools, Pro Bono Home, http://www.aals.orglprobono/index.html.
However, much more needs to be done to make these issues central to the
educational experience.
164. Compare Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. (1983) ("Whatever the
definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public
against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons."), with Kritzer, supra note
123. Refer also to the sources cited in Rhode, Justice, supra note 153, and Rhode,
Professionalism,supra note 120.
165. Hal Lancaster, Rating Lawyers: If Your Legal ProblemsAre Complex, a Clinic
May Not Be the Answer, Wall St. J., July 31, 1980, at 1 (quoting Robert Ellickson)
(internal quotations omitted).
166. Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions:An Exploratory
Essay, 1985 Am. B. Found. Res. J., at 1, 29; Citron, supra note 123; Michael Zander,
The State of Justice 23 n.61 (2000).
167. ABA, Select Comm. Report on the 2000 Midyear Meeting, available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2000hous.html.
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A profession truly committed to public protection would not only
reverse this position, it would also rethink the rules governing lawyers'
dealings with unrepresented parties. In response to bar opposition,
the commission that drafted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
deleted provisions enjoining lawyers who appeared against pro se
opponents from "unfairly exploiting.., ignorance of the law" and
from "procur[ing] an unconscionable result.""It a
According to
opponents, "parties 'too cheap 1to69 hire a lawyer' should not be
'coddled' by special treatment. 1
Under the draft ultimately
approved, lawyers' sole responsibility is to avoid implying that they
are disinterested and to "make reasonable efforts to correct...
misunderstanding[s]" concerning their role. 7
Such minimal obligations have proven totally inadequate to curb
overreaching behavior in contexts involving many unrepresented and
uninformed parties. Counsel for more powerful litigants in landlordtenant, consumer, and family law disputes often mislead opponents
into waiving important rights and accepting inadequate settlements.7
Since these individuals typically do not know or cannot prove that
they were misinformed by opposing counsel, such conduct rarely
results in any disciplinary or judicial sanctions."As these examples suggest, the bar's commitment to equal justice
remains largely rhetorical. Most attorneys support the concept, but
only as long as it does not put their own interests at risk. Stephen
Gillers aptly observes that "[tihe lawyers who approved the [Model]
Rules looked after their own."''
Significant reform will require
enlisting other Americans to look after their own, and to demand a
justice system more accessible and more accountable to the public
interest.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE ASPIRATION: ADEQUATE
ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Strategies for increasing access to justice are not in short supply.
The past quarter century has spawned a cottage industry of
recommendations by commissions, conferences, committees, and task
forces. But what has not emerged is any consensus around
manageable reforms or a substantial constituency demanding them.
To make significant progress, we will first need to identify realistic
objectives and to mobilize the profession and the public in their
168. See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives, supra note 156, at 611 (quoting Model Rules
of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.6 (Discussion Draft 1983)).
169. Id (quoting commentators).
170. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 4.3 (1983).
171. See, e.g., Engler, Out of Sight, supra note 44, at 107-30.
172. See idat 133-37.
173. Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
CriticalView of the Model Rules, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 243,245 (1985) (citation omitted).
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support. Despite the conceptual difficulties surrounding access to
justice, several principles seem likely to command broad agreement.
While equal access to justice may be an implausible ideal, adequate
access should remain a societal aspiration. To that end, courts, bar
associations, law schools, legal aid providers, and community
organizations must work together to develop comprehensive,
coordinated systems for the delivery of legal services. Under such
systems, legal procedures and support structures should be designed
to maximize individuals' opportunities to address law-related
problems themselves, without expensive professional assistance.
Those who need, but cannot realistically afford, lawyers should have
reasonable opportunities for competent services. Opportunities for
assistance should be available for all individuals, not just citizens or
those meeting some political litmus test.
Reducing the need for professional assistance calls for strategies
along several dimensions: increased simplification of the law; more
self-help initiatives; better protection of unrepresented parties; greater
access to nonlawyer providers; and expanded opportunities for
informal dispute resolution in accessible out-of-court settings. As
critics have long noted, American legal procedures are strewn with
unnecessary formalities, archaic jargon, and cumbersome rituals that
7
discourage individuals from resolving legal problems themselves. 1
Simplified forms and streamlined procedures could expand ordinary
Americans' opportunities to handle routine matters such as
governmental benefits, probate, uncontested divorces, landlord-tenant
disputes, and consumer claims.
More assistance for self-representation would serve similar
objectives. All jurisdictions should have comprehensive services such
as free or low-cost workshops, hotlines, court-house advisors, and
walk-in centers that provide personalized multilingual assistance at
accessible times and locations. Courts and bar ethical rules should
also provide unrepresented parties with greater protection. Judges
should assume affirmative obligations to prevent manifest injustice,
modeled on precedents from small-claims courts and administrative
agencies. 175 Lawyers should be enjoined from knowingly exploiting
the ignorance of an unrepresented party. More specifically, they
should be held to standards analogous to those governing ex parte
proceedings, which require lawyers
to disclose facts and claims
176
necessary for an informed decision.
174. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants:
A Consumer Based Approach (1999); Fred Rodell, Woe Unto You, Lawyersl 123-37
(2d ed. 1957); Franklin Strier, Reconstructing Justice: An Agenda for Trial Reform
233-34 (1994); Cramton, supra note 111, at 562-64; Johnson, Legal Needs, supra note
138, at 486; see also Houseman, Legal Assistance, supra note 1.
175. See Engler, Justice for All, supra note 109, at 2063, 2068-69; Engler, Out of
Sight, supra note 44, at 142-47.
176. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(d) (1983); Engler, Out of Sight,
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Individuals should also have greater access to nonlawyer providers
of legal services. In devising appropriate alternatives to sweeping
unauthorized practice prohibitions, courts and legislatures must
balance the public interest in maximizing access as well as minimizing
harm. Considerations should include the ability of nonlawyer
providers to provide adequate assistance, the risks of injury if they do
not, and the ability of consumers to assess providers' qualifications
and to remedy problems caused by ineffective performance.17 Where
the risk of injury is substantial, in contexts such as immigration
involving unsophisticated and vulnerable consumers, lay practitioners
could be subject to licensing requirements. In other fields, it might be
adequate to register practitioners and to allow voluntary certification
of those who meet certain established standards. Moreover, "[s]tates
also could require all lay practitioners to carry malpractice insurance,
to contribute to client security funds," and to observe basic ethical
obligations
governing confidentiality, competence, and conflicts of
178
interest.
Americans would also benefit from more effective channels for
informal dispute resolution in out-of-court settings. For example,
organizations over a certain size could be required to establish
internal complaint procedures or to participate in industry-wvide
grievance systems that met prescribed standards of procedural
fairness. Many organizations now lack such procedures or have
arbitration and mediation processes that are skewed against
complainants. 179 Considerable evidence suggests that well-designed
employee and consumer grievance procedures benefit both
institutional and individual participants, and that most people prefer
to resolve disputes in informal, nonlegal settings.1w
Giving
organizations greater responsibility for "doing justice" internally is
likely to prove more cost-effective than relying on less accessible
judicial remedies.'

supra note 44, at 139-42; cf.supra note 164 and accompanying text.
177. ABA Comm. on Nonlawyer Practice, supra note 120, at 137; Rhode,
Professionalism,supra note 120, at 714-15.
178. Rhode, Professionalism,supra note 120, at 715.
179. Compulsory arbitration systems sponsored by employers who are repeat
players often systematically disadvantage employees who are not. See Richard C.
Reuben, The Bias Factor,Cal. Law., Nov. 1999, at 25; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections
on Judicial ADR and the Multi-door Courthouse at Twenty:" Fait Accompli, Failed
Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 Ohio St. J.on Disp. Resol. 297, 387 (1996);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Conmunity and Coercion Under tile
FederalArbitrationAct, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 1015-17 (1999).
180. For research on internal processes, see Parker, supra note 153, at 184-88. For
preferences regarding dispute resolution, see Zander, supra note 166, at 29-32; and
Hazel G. Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law
217-18 (1999).
181. See Parker, supra note 153, at 188-89; cf. Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite,
Corporations, Crime and Accountability 197 (1993).
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Courts, legislatures, and bar associations should also assume greater
obligations to insure adequate legal assistance for those who need but
cannot realistically afford it. What constitutes "adequate," "need"
and "affordability"
are, of course, somewhat subjective
determinations. But by almost any standard, our current system falls
far short. Courts must do more to ensure competent performance of
lawyers in criminal cases, and opportunities for legal representation in
civil cases. Standards governing malpractice and effective assistance
of counsel should be strengthened, certification for lawyers in capital
cases should be required, and states should be obligated to allocate
sufficient resources for indigent defense. In civil contexts, courts
should be more willing to appoint lawyers and to strike down funding
restrictions that prevent adequate representation.
Other eligibility restrictions also require rethinking.
Most
European nations guarantee legal assistance for a much broader
category of individuals than those entitled to legal aid in this country.
Under the eligibility structures of other nations, relevant
considerations include: Does the claim have a reasonable possibility
of success? What would be the benefits of legal assistance or the
harms if it is unavailable?" Would a reasonable lawyer, advising a
reasonable client suggest that the client use his or her own money to
pursue the issue?'13 In assessing financial eligibility, these systems
typically operate with sliding scales. This approach permits at least
partial coverage for a broader range of clients than American legal aid
offices, which serve only those below or just over the poverty line.',,
These more liberal eligibility structures avoid a major limitation of the
United States model, which excludes many individuals with urgent
problems and no realistic means of addressing them.1 5
The political prospects for expanding coverage along these lines in
this country are, to be sure, less than encouraging. At a time of
growing skepticism toward entitlement programs for the poor, and
declining funds for federal legal services, any proposal for broader
coverage will face an uphill battle. But a legal aid system that
included a wider spectrum of the public would have broader appeal
than a system benefitting only the poor. And financial support for
such a system could come from a variety of sources likely to command
greater support than general tax funds. Examples include: a tax on
182. Mark Richardson & Steven Reynolds, The Shrinking Public Purse: Civil Legal
Aid in New South Wales, Australia, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 349,360 (1994).
183. Jeremy Cooper, English Legal Services: A Tale of DiminishingReturns, 5 Md.
J. Contemp. Legal Issues 247, 253 (1994); see also Quail v. Municipal Court, 171 Cal.
App. 3d 572, 590 n.13 (1985) (citing the German test: whether the matter would be
pursued by a reasonable person able to pay the cost). Britain has now moved away
from an entitlement structure. See Zander, supra note 166, at 9-25.
184. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3 (1999).
185. Houseman, Legal Assistance, supra note 1, at 431; ABA, Findings of the
Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 7-17 (1994).
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law-related revenues; a surcharge on court costs for cases that exceed
a certain amount; more opportunities for court-awarded fees for
prevailing parties; and pro bono requirements for lawyers that could
be satisfied by fifty hours of annual service or the financial
equivalent.1" In a nation that spends over $90 billion on private legal
fees, a modest 1-2% tax would substantially increase the capacity of
So would significant pro bono
civil legal aid programs.18
contributions by close to a million attorneys.
It is a national disgrace that civil legal aid programs now reflect less
than 1% of the nation's legal expenditures." And it is a professional
disgrace that pro bono service occupies less than 1% of lawyers'
working hours. We can and must do more, and our greatest challenge
lies in persuading the public and the profession to share that view.
More education and research needs to focus on what passes for justice
among the have-nots. 189 Law schools have a unique opportunity and a
corresponding obligation to insure that issues concerning access to
legal services occupy a central place in their curricula, and that pro
bono activity plays a central role in their students' educational
experience. 190
This country has come a considerable distance since 1919, when
Reginald Heber Smith published his landmark account of Justice and
the Poor. At that time, the entire nation had only about forty legal aid
organizations, with sixty full-time attorneys and a combined budget of
less than $200,00.191 Yet despite our substantial progress, we are
nowhere close to the goal that Smith envisioned: "that denial of
justice on account of poverty shall forever be made impossible in
America."'" That ideal should remain our aspiration, and occasions
like this can serve as reminders of all that still stands in the way.

186. See D'Alemberte, supra note 139.
187. Johnson, Equal Justice,supra note 7, at 215.
188. Id.
189. See Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 138. These issues have
attracted disturbingly little attention from constitutional law scholars since Frank
Michelman's landmark 1973 work. See Michelman, supra note 80.
190. See Rhode, Cultures of Commitment, supra note 138, at 2433-36; supra text
accompanying notes 162-63.
191. Jerald S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem
America 53-62 (1976); Bryant Garth, Neighborhood Law Firms for the Poor 19-20
(1980).
192. Reginald Heber Smith, Justice and the Poor 249 (1919).
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